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Abstract:
This paper considers industry earnings differentials in Ireland between 1987 and
1994.  Earnings equations are estimated using data from 2 cross-section
surveys.  Industry differentials are calculated and their stability over time and
the importance of industry in determining earnings assessed.  Finally, the causes
of the differentials found are explored.
* I am grateful to Brian Nolan for access to the datasets used in this paper and to Andrea
Ichino and Robert Waldmann for helpful comments and suggestions.  All remaining errors are
my own1
Section 1: Introduction
This paper considers industry earnings differentials in Ireland between 1987 and
1994.  If such differentials exist, they are a sign of deviations from competitive
theory.  In perfectly competitive labour theory, earnings should depend only on
employees abilities and not on employer or firm characteristics, i.e., not
dependent on the industry of employment.  If industry earnings differentials
exist, they are a sign that either firms do not profit maximise or that some firms
find it profitable to pay earnings above the going rate.  This is the basis of
efficiency earnings theory.  Among the reasons proposed for the existence of
efficiency earnings theory are to raise effort level, promote loyalty to the
employer, minimize turnover costs and for selection reasons to attract higher
quality applicants.  It is possible that if industry earnings differentials exist, they
may reflect unmeasured human capital or non-pecuniary compensation or
transitory demand factors.  Outside of efficiency earnings theory, other reasons
proposed for the existence of earnings differentials include compensating
differentials (see, e.g., Rosen, 1986) or the insider-outsider model (Lindbeck
and Snower, 1986).
ODonnell (1998) considered the reasons for increased earnings inequality in
Ireland between 1987 and 1994 and found that within industry changes drove
movements in the employment structure while earnings inequality increased
between industries.  How could these results be expected to influence industry
differentials?  The increasing between-industry inequality should be reflected in
increasing industry differentials but the within industry changes may have had
offsetting or neutral effects on industry differentials.
Section 2 describes the data used, Section 3 how the industry differentials are
calculated, Section 4 the earnings equations on which the differentials are based
and Section 5 the results.  Section 6 explores the causes of industry differentials
while Section 7 concludes.
Section 2: Data
The data used are 2 cross-section, household surveys for 1987 and 1994
collected by the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) in Dublin.  The
first, the Survey of Income Distribution, Poverty and Usage of State Services
has been extensively used for poverty and labour market research (see Callan,
Nolan et al (1989) for a description of the survey and Callan and Nolan (1994)2
for an overview of the research).  The second, the 1994 Living in Ireland Survey
forms the Irish module of the European Community Household Panel (see
Callan, Nolan et al (1996) for a description of the survey and a study of
household poverty).  The sampling frame for both surveys was the Electoral
Register and both have been re-weighted to correspond with the Labour Force
Survey for key household characteristics.  The response rate for the 1987 survey
was 64% and 62.5% in 1994, corresponding to 3,294 and 4,048 households
respectively.  Earnings data and labour market characteristics were obtained
from around 2,700 employees in 1987 and around 3,000 in 1994.  The focus
here is on usual gross weekly earnings from full-time employment (defined as
working 30+ hours per week).  This leaves a sample for analysis of 2,426 in
1987 and 2,768 in 1994, after discarding observations with missing information.
Section 3: Measurement of Industry Differentials
Write the cross-section earnings equation as
(1) lnWX D it it it it it =+ + + ab j e
where  Dit  is a vector of industry dummy variables.  The industries are (1)
Agriculture, forestry and fishing (2) Building and Construction (3) Other
Production (4) Wholesaling (5) Retailing (6) Insurance (7) Transport (8)
Professional Services (9) Teaching (10) Health (11) Public Administration (12)
Personal Services and (13) Other.  The vector  Xit consists of human capital,
demographic and occupational variables and should control for individual-
specific factors which can vary between industries and thus influence the mean
industry earnings level.  If individual specific differences are perfectly
controlled for, the estimated js represent the earnings premia in each industry
with respect to the omitted industry which in this case is Other Production, as
it is the largest category.  These are normalised into deviations from the mean
differential by calculating the employment-weighted average for all industries.
The industry differentials then reported in Section 5 are the difference between
the estimated coefficient and the weighted mean differential as follows
(2) jj j k k j
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where  K is the number of industries in the sample and v j is the share of
employees employed in industry j.  For the omitted industry, the employment-








The overall variability in industry earnings is summarised by the standard
deviation of the industry earnings differentials, following Kreuger and Summers
(1988).  For each industry, i=1..K, the estimated earnings differential ji
Ù
 is an
unbiased estimate of the true differential but the standard deviation of ji
Ù
 is an
upwardly biased estimate of the standard deviation of ji
Ù
.  The bias occurs
because ji
Ù




 is a least squares sampling error.
The standard deviation of j
Ù
is adjusted by using the formula
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where  s i
Ù
 is the standard error of ji
Ù
.  As this adjustment neglects the
covariances among the ei, it slightly underestimates the standard deviation of
j.  This adjusted standard deviation gives equal weight to each industry
category, regardless of their employment share.
Section 4: Estimation of Earnings Equations
This section describes the earnings equations from which the industry
differentials will be estimated.  Firstly, human capital earnings equations are
estimated, for males and females separately.  These human capital variables are
years spent out of the labour force, years of experience and the square of each of
these variables.  4 educational level dummies are included and a dummy if an
individual has an apprenticeship qualification or not.  The baseline educational
dummy is education below group/junior/intermediate certificate, i.e., education
below the middle of the secondary cycle.  The other education dummies are
education to group/junior/intermediate certificate (some secondary),
completed secondary education (secondary), a non-University diploma or
certificate at post second level (diploma) and a University degree
(University).  A dummy if the individual is married is also included.4
Then the analysis is broadened to consider occupational dummies and a dummy
for union membership.  It should be noted that female self-selection is not
accounted for and that this problem may have changed over the period due to
rising female participation in the labour force from 30.9% in 1986 to 34.9% in
1993.  Ideally, to study industry differentials, one would also have information
on working conditions such as whether or not employees had to face irregular
hours or health hazards.  In all the regressions described below, the data were
weighted with sampling weights containing the inverse of the probability that
the observation is included due to the sampling strategy.  All regression results
are reported in the Appendix.
Human Capital Specification without industry dummies
Table A1 presents the results for the human capital model for females in 1987
and 1994.  Each extra year out of the labour force brings a penalty of 2% in
1987 worsening to 4% by 1994.  The experience coefficients have the expected
sign.  An extra year of experience brings a premium of around 7% in each year.
Earnings are maximised at 26 years of experience in each year.  Being married
has an effect insignificantly different from zero in 1987 which becomes a
significant premium of 8% by 1994.  There is evidence of a fall in the returns to
all educational qualifications by 1994.  Having an apprenticeship qualification
brings a penalty of 16% in 1987 which becomes insignificant by 1994.
The results for men appear in Table A2.  A year out of the labour force brings a
penalty of 6% in 1987 falling to 4% by 1994.  Earnings are maximised at 33
years of experience in both years.  The marriage premium is much higher than
that for females, at 20% in 1987 and 22% in 1994.  There is evidence of
increasing returns to university education over the period.
Occupational Specification
Results for the occupational specification for women appear in Table A3 below.
Earnings are now maximised at 26 years of experience in both years.  The
returns to education have fallen a lot between 1987 and 1994 and are much
lower compared to the human capital model for each year, as expected, because
of collinearity with the occupational variables.  The return to union membership
falls slightly from a 20% premium in 1987 to 17% in 1994.  Among the
occupational dummies, the big change was a large fall in the premium to the
Clerical category over the period and an increase in the premia to the other
category.  The discussion of the industry premia will be left until the following
section.5
Table A4 shows the results for the occupational specification for men.  The
marriage premium rises slightly from 15% in 1987 to 19% in 1994.  The penalty
for years out of the labour force falls from 5% in 1987 to 3% in 1994. The
returns to experience change little.  Again, the return to a University
qualification increases, from 60% to 66%.  As expected, the returns to education
are generally lower than for the human capital model.  The returns to the
various occupations generally worsened between the 2 years, with the
exceptions of the Professional category where the premium was constant and
the Other category where the premium increased.  The premium to union
membership fell from 17% in 1987 to 13% in 1994.  The industry premia are
discussed in the following section.
F-tests that the industry coefficients jointly equal zero were rejected for each
year and for each gender group but many of the industry dummies are not
individually statistically significant.
Table A5 shows the results when we pool the female and male samples,
including a female dummy.  The penalty to being female rises slightly from
around 15% in 1987 to around 17% in 1994.  The marriage premium increases
from 9% to 14%.  The returns to experience and years out of the labour force
change little.  There is evidence of a fall in returns to educational qualifications
at all levels and a slight fall in the returns to having an apprenticeship
qualification, though this category was insignificant in 1987.  Considering
occupations, there is a fall in the return to a Clerical occupation from 12% to
7%.  The return to being in a Professional occupation falls slightly from 26% to
24%.  The return to being in the Other category increases from 26% to 34%.
The premium for trade union membership falls from 17% to 15%. Industry
differentials are discussed below.
Pooled human capital model
To assess the significance of these changes, data for both years were pooled and
the differential effect of each variable in 1994 as compared to 1987 assessed.
Results are in Table A6 below.
For females, it is clear that the increase in the marriage premium is insignificant.
Evidence of an increase in the returns to experience is also clear.  A significant
increase in the returns to all levels of education is found as is a significant
increase in the returns to having an apprenticeship qualification.6
For males, there is evidence of a significant increase in the returns to
experience.  There is again evidence of an increase in the returns to all levels of
education and to an apprenticeship qualification.
Pooled occupational model
Including industry and occupational dummies, (Table A7), for females, again
there is evidence of an increase in the returns to experience.  There is an
increase in the returns to all levels of education.  There are significant increases
in the returns to all of the occupational dummies and to union membership.
For men, again an increase in the returns to experience and all levels of
education is evident.  The return to an apprenticeship qualification is again
significant.  As with women, there are increases in the returns to all the
occupational dummies and to union membership.
Section 5: Results on Industry differentials
The analysis of industry differentials, calculated as in Equation 2, is based on
the occupational model, i.e., Tables A3 and A4 above.  Table 1 shows the
results for females in each year.
Table 1: Industry Differentials for females, 1987 and 1994




Agri. -0.019 0.0671 -0.008 0.048
Building and
Construction
-0.229 0.2515 0.194 0.1244
Wholesaling 0.002 0.0925 0.027 0.0503
Retailing -0.111 0.1000 -0.124 0.0615
Insurance 0.193 0.0699 0.166 0.055
Transport 0.015 0.0766 0.060 0.063
Professional Services -0.021 0.1162 -0.053 0.0887
Teaching 0.013 0.0935 0.035 0.0576
Health 0.044 0.064 0.054 0.0506
Public Administration -0.042 0.0643 -0.024 0.057
Personal Services -0.290 0.0935 -0.181 0.0623
Other -0.162 0.1498 -0.114 0.0535
Other Production,
baseline





Due to the high number of industry categories (13) relative to the sample size,
many of the industry categories in the earnings equations were insignificant but
were jointly statistically significant.  In 1987, females in the insurance category
get the highest earning premia, on average 20% above the earnings in all
industries, followed by the Other Production Category at 11%.  However, the
insurance category was insignificant in the earnings equation.  Employees in
personal services were worst off, suffering a penalty of 29% relative to the
average in all industries.  The coefficient on this category was significant in the
earnings equation.  Seven industries had negative premia.  By 1994, employees
in the Building and Construction category were best off with a premium of 19%
relative to the average, followed by workers in the insurance category with a
premia of 16.6%.  Neither of these categories were significant in the earnings
equation.  Again, worst off were those in personal services but the size of their
penalty had fallen by 11 percentage points but remained significant.  The
premia in the Other Production baseline category had fallen to 6%.  Six
industries now had negative premia.
For those categories significant in both years, i.e., retailing, personal services
and other (borderline significance in 1987), the change in the differential is
large for the personal services category of the magnitude of 10 percentage
points, half that for the other category and minimal for the retailing category.
Total variability was slightly higher in 1994 compared to 1987 with an ASD,
calculated as in Equation 4, in the later year of 0.087 compared to 0.073.  This
is as we would have expected given the increased earnings inequality over the
period.
Table 2: Industry Differentials for males, 1987 and 1994




Agri. -0.068 0.0764 -0.317 0.0642
Building and
Construction
-0.051 0.053 0.000 0.0334
Wholesaling -0.029 0.0711 0.019 0.0349
Retailing -0.164 0.0507 -0.147 0.0483
Insurance 0.284 0.0614 0.139 0.0499
Transport 0.036 0.0304 0.097 0.0294
Professional Services 0.045 0.1252 -0.281 0.14868
Teaching -0.078 0.072 -0.099 0.0467
Health -0.066 0.048 0.013 0.0517
Public Administration -0.014 0.034 0.006 0.0317
Personal Services -0.18 0.0704 -0.053 0.0541
Other 0.007 0.0779 -0.064 0.0609
Other Production,
baseline





For males, the same problem of insignificance of industry categories arises in
the earnings equations but again the industry variables were jointly statistically
significant.  For males in 1987, again those in the insurance category were best
off with a premium of 28% relative to the average and this category was
significant in the earnings equation.  Worst off were those in personal services
(significant), followed closely by those in retailing (significant).  8 categories
had negative premia.  By 1994, again those in the Insurance category were best
off but their premium had fallen to 14% and was insignificant.  Worst off were
those in agriculture (significant), strangely followed by those in Professional
Services (significant).  However, this is a very small category, accounting for
just 1.5% of male employment in 1987 and under 1% by 1994 respectively.
This category has lower relative earnings, given the level of human capital and
demographic variables among employees there.  The premium for those in the
Other Production baseline category had increased slightly.  6 categories now
had negative premia.  The penalty for the personal services category had fallen a
lot.
Of those categories significant or borderline significant in both years, the fall in
the penalty attached to the retailing category fell slightly while the premium
attached to the insurance category fell by more than half.  There was a slight
increase in the penalty attached to the teaching category and a large fall in the
penalty attached to being in the personal services category.  As with the female
differentials, total variability was higher in 1994 with an ASD of 0.1207
compared to 0.0948, again as expected.
Female and Male differentials compared
Of those categories significant for both females and males in 1987, females in
the retailing category were 11% worse off than the average female employee9
while males in this category were 16% worse off than the average male.  The
relative penalty attached to the public administration category was higher for
females than males at 4% versus 1.5%.  Females in the personal services
category were 30% worse off than the average female employee while males in
this category experienced a relative penalty of almost 20%.  The relative
premium attached to the baseline of Other Production was much higher for
females than males at 11% compared to 4.5%.
In 1994, the relative penalty attached to the retailing category was slightly lower
for females and males.  In Insurance, females had a slightly higher relative
premia.  In Personal Services, females were almost four times more worse off
than males and were almost twice as worse off in the Other category.  Females
had a slight relative advantage in the Other Production baseline category.
In both years, the male earnings differentials showed greater variability than the
female differentials.  This is not surprising given the greater within group
inequality for men noted in ODonnell (1998).
Pooling females and males
Given the problems of insignificance, we pooled the male and female samples
and included a dummy for females in the earnings equations, the results of
which can be seen in Table A5.  The resulting industry differentials are in Table
3 below.
Table 3: Industry Differentials for males and females together, 1987 and
1994




Agri. -0.090 0.0710 -0.306 0.0633
Building and
Construction
-0.072 0.0509 0.013 0.0324
Wholesaling -0.018 0.0588 0.024 0.0302
Retailing -0.180 0.0453 -0.154 0.0381
Insurance 0.237 0.0451 0.163 0.0357
Transport 0.027 0.0285 0.093 0.0261
Professional Services -0.015 0.0847 -0.192 0.1057
Teaching -0.063 0.0573 -0.049 0.0354
Health -0.011 0.0379 0.027 0.0334
Public Administration -0.026 0.0305 0.006 0.0292
Personal Services 0.027 0.0596 -0.128 0.0421
Other -0.048 0.0708 -0.086 0.041110
Other Production,
baseline





Pooling males and females, in 1987, employees in the insurance category were
best off in both years and this category was significant in both earnings
equations.  The premium for this category was almost 24% in 1987 and had
fallen to 16% in 1994.  The worst off category in 1987 was retailing
(significant) and in 1994, agriculture (significant) which had worsened
drastically since 1987.  The penalty to retailing had fallen slightly by 1994.  9
categories had negative premia in 1987 and 6 in 1994.  The premium for the
baseline category of Other Production was more or less constant between the
two years.  An F-test that the industry coefficients in the pooled earnings
equation equaled zero was rejected.
For those categories significant or borderline significant in both years, the
penalty for the agriculture category relative to the average had increased
massively from 9% to 30%.  The relative penalty for the retailing category had
fallen slightly from 18% to 15%.  For the insurance category, the relative
premium had fallen from 26% by ten percentage points to 16%.  In teaching, the
relative penalty had fallen from 6% to 5% while in public administration, a
2.5% penalty had become a 0.6% premium.  There was little change in the
Other Production baseline.  As with females and males, separately, there was
greater variability in 1994 than in 1987, as would have been expected.
Stability over time
The industry differentials do not appear highly correlated over time.  The
correlation coefficient between the female differentials in the 2 years is 0.516,
between the male 0.437 and for the sample as a whole 0.654.  The fact that
many of the industry coefficients in the earnings equations are individually
insignificant and change a lot between the two years will impact on the level of
stability.  Also, the significance of the correlation coefficient is sensitive to the
number of industry categories, in this case just 13.  The statistical significance
of the correlation coefficients are tested as per Kendall and Stuart (1977) (See
Zanchi, 1997)
1.  The t-transformation for the female sample is 1.9979 and for
1 In testing the null hypothesis that the population correlation coefficient r = 0, the sample
correlation coefficient can be reduced to a Students t-distribution.  We test the null11
the male sample 1.6114, compared to the 1% critical value of 2.718.  Thus, for
the male and female samples separately, we can not reject the null hypothesis
that the correlation coefficient equals zero.
But even for the pooled sample, where the majority of the industry coefficients
in each year are significant, the correlation coefficient is not terribly high at
0.654.  With a t-transformation value of 2.8672, this is significant at a 1% level.
Thus, it is possible that transitory demand factors or short-run labour
immobility are relevant factors in explaining these differentials.  However, the
high number of industry categories relative to the sample size impacts on the
significance and stability of the estimated coefficients and thus the significance
and stability of the correlations.
Changes in measures of fit
The importance of industry affiliation can be assessed by looking at the
increases in the R
2 when different variables are added to the earnings
equations.  In this case, we use the human capital and union membership
variables as control variables.  From Table 4, it is clear that for both men and
women in each year, human capital variables are more important as
explanations of the earning structure than industry affiliation.  The baseline
model regressors are a dummy for married, 8 occupational dummies and years
out of the labour force and its square.  The human capital variables are the 4
educational level dummies, a dummy for apprenticeship and years of experience
and its square.  The industry categories are the 12 dummies previously used and
the union membership dummy is as before.
In 1987, the human capital variables increase the  R
2 by 53.6% for women and
for men by a much lower value of 37%.  The industry dummies increase the R
2
by 26% for women and 17% for men.  The union membership variable increases
the  R
2 by 25% for women and 14% for men.  Thus for both men and women,
industry affiliation is just slightly more important than union membership in
explaining earnings.
In 1994, the importance of the human capital variables have fallen somewhat
for both men and women, causing an increase in the R
2 of 42% for women and
30.5% for men.  The importance of the industry dummies falls also, causing a
hypothesis that r = 0against the alternative hypothesis r > 0, i.e., stability of the industry
wage structure.  The t-transformation is tnr r =- - {( ) / ( )} / 21 22 1 2  where r is the sample
correlation coefficient and n the number of industries.12
16% increase in the R
2 for women and a 7.6% increase for men.  The
importance of the union membership variable also falls to 14.6% for women and
5% for men.  Again, the gap between the union membership and industry
dummies is very small.  But the industry variables are certainly not trivial in
explaining earnings.
It is interesting that each of the three types of variable considered is always
more important in explaining earnings for women than for men, suggesting that
either unobservables or the occupational and demographic variables are more
important for men.
Table 4: Effect on  R
2 of adding human capital and industry variables
1987 1994
Women Men Women Men





































The effect on the R
2 of each of the sets of human capital, union membership
and industry variables falls between 1987 and 1994 for both men and women,
perhaps suggesting that the role of unobservables becomes more important.  Of
course, it could be the case that other variables such as the demographic or
occupational variables increase in importance between the two years.
Section 6: Exploring the Causes of Industry Differentials
The industry differentials we have found could be due to differences in
unmeasured aspects of labour quality across industries.  The effect of alternative
degrees of control for human capital is examined in Table 5.  If industry
differentials are due to observed or unobserved differences in labour quality
across industries, there should be a fall in the dispersion of industry earnings
once we control for measured human capital.
Table 5: Alternative degrees of control for human capital13
1987 1994
ASD of industry earning
differentials
Controls Female Male Female Male
(1) none 0.119 0.1104 0.115 0.127
5
(2) dummies for 4
educational levels and
apprenticeship
0.108 0.0917 0.112 0.114
4
(3) as (2) with years of
experience and its square
0.073 0.0948 0.087 0.120
7
From Table 5, it is clear that the ASD does fall but not to a very large extent.
The biggest fall of almost 40% is for females in 1987.  The ASD of the male
earning differentials actually increase if controls for experience are added to the
earnings equation.  Thus, unless differences in unmeasured human capital are
much more important than differences in measured education and experience, it
is unlikely that these differences in unmeasured human capital are what is
causing the industry earnings differentials.
The small sample size limits the extent to which we can test for the causes of
industry differentials by comparing differentials by sub-groups.  However, we
do estimate industry differentials by union and non-union employees to check if
the differentials could be the result of varying degrees of union power.  We
would expect to find less variation in non-union earnings if the differentials
resulted from strong unions which could raise their earnings in certain
industries without suffering employment losses.
Table 6 shows the ASD of industry differentials by unionised and non-
unionised employees.  An F-test of the hypothesis that the industry coefficients
in the earnings equation were jointly insignificant was rejected.






(1) non-unionised 0.1218 0.1069
(2) unionised 0.1101 0.0829
correlation of (1) and (2) 0.15 0.85
t-transformation 0.5032 5.351614
reject  Ho:r = 0 at 1%
significance level
no yes
The variation in non-union earnings differentials is actually slightly higher than
in unionised earnings differentials in each year and this is what would be
expected, given previous studies of union membership.  This gives little
credence to the union power argument.
The correlation of union and non-union earnings is extremely low in 1987 at
0.15 but increases dramatically to 0.85 by 1994.  However, the null hypothesis
that the correlation coefficient equals zero can not be rejected in 1987.
Table 7 presents results on industry earning differentials by age, comparing
those aged under 30 and those aged 30 plus and Table 8 by years of experience,
comparing those with under 20 years of experience and those with 20 plus
years.  Again, F-tests that the industry coefficients in the earnings equation were
jointly zero were rejected.





(1) aged under 30 0.1104 0.0473
(2) aged 30 + 0.098 0.1385
correlation of (1) and (2) 0.503 0.694
t-transformation 1.9302 3.1969
reject  Ho:r = 0 at 1%
significance level
no yes
The ASD shows little difference between older and younger workers in 1987
but the correlation coefficient is quite low.  By 1994, the dispersion among
younger workers is much lower than among older workers and the correlation
coefficient has increased to 0.694.  Thus, there is some evidence that the age
structure or seniority has a part to play in determining industry differentials.
However, as in the previous table, we can not reject the null hypothesis that the
correlation coefficient equals zero in 1987.





(1) under 20 years of
experience
0.1015 0.1102
(2) 20 + years of experience 0.1266 0.1223
correlation of (1) and (2) 0.5778 0.7305
t-transformation 2.3479 3.5477
reject  Ho:r = 0 at 1%
significance level
no yes
The structure of industry differentials by years of experience is remarkably
stable.  In each year, there is slightly less variation in differentials for workers
with less than 20 years of experience.  As with the previous two tables, we can
not reject the null hypothesis that the correlation coefficient equals zero in
1987.
Thus, in general, we find that the industry earnings structure is quite stable.
Exceptions to this fact are the low correlation between union and non-union
workers in 1987.  By 1994, the correlation is much higher.  This can possibly be
explained by the introduction of centralised bargaining agreements in 1987,
after which point many more employees were covered by negotiated agreements
than previously.  Another puzzling factor is the very low ASD of workers aged
under 30 in 1994.  The share of this group in total employment fell between
1987 and 1994 as participation in education increased.  The results in Table 7
give some slight evidence  that seniority has a role to play in determining
industry earnings differentials.






(1) manual occupations 0.1288 0.1731
(2) non-manual occupations 0.1014 0.1318
correlation of (1) and (2) 0.859 -0.1456
t-transformation 5.5647 0.4881
reject  Ho:r = 0 at 1%
significance level
yes no
Table 9 shows differences in industry differentials by manual/non-manual
occupation.  As the occupational categories were very broadly defined, the
distinction between manual and non-manual occupations is likely to be quite16
inaccurate.  The occupational groups of agricultural workers, producers,
labourers and unskilled workers and transport and communication workers were
defined as manual workers with the remaining categories of defined as non-
manual workers.
In 1987, the variation in manual earnings was slightly higher than in non-
manual earnings and the correlation between the two groups was high at 0.859
and significant.  In 1994, again the variation in manual earnings was higher than
in non-manual earnings but the correlation between the two groups was now
negative and not statistically different from zero.  Thus, there seems to have
been a huge divergence in the earnings structure of these two groups of workers
in the seven year period.  By 1994, it is not the case that industries that tend to
pay workers in one occupational group above the average tend to pay workers
in other occupational groups above the average as well.  This is some evidence
on favour of an unmeasured labour quality explanation of industry earnings
differentials as it is unlikely that workers in different occupations within an
industry have the same levels of unmeasured ability.  It also gives some strength
to arguments based on monitoring as monitoring costs are likely to vary by
occupation.  However, it is more likely that this instability in the earnings
structure in 1994 reflects the impact of the forces for increased earnings
inequality described in ODonnell (1998).  This divergence of the manual and
non-manual wage structure is consistent with the argument that technology
change has increased the productivity of more skilled workers.
Section 7: Conclusions
Pooling males and females, employees in the Insurance category were best off
in each year but the relative premium in this category fell from 26% to 16% in
the seven year period.  Worst off were those in the retailing category in 1987
and in agriculture in 1994.  The penalty to the agriculture category increased
dramatically between 1987 and 1994.  For the sample as a whole, the
correlation coefficient between the industry differentials over the two years of
data was 0.654, not terribly high.  Thus, transitory demand shocks or short-run
labour immobility may be relevant factors in explaining these differentials.  The
instability of the estimated coefficients may be evidence against the
compensating differentials hypothesis as, over a seven year period, sharp
changes in working conditions which would warrant changing returns are
unlikely.  But, as stated previously, the high number of industry categories
relative to the sample size impacts on the significance and stability of the
estimated coefficients and thus on that of the correlations.17
Human capital variables are a stronger explanation of earnings than industry
variables which in turn are marginally stronger than union membership.  In
testing for the causes of industry earnings differentials, we find that neither
unmeasured human capital nor union power seem to be the answer.  However,
there is some evidence that the wage structure or seniority has a role to play.
The correlation between union and non-union earnings increases dramatically
between 1987 and 1994.  This could be explained by the introduction of
centralised bargaining agreements in 1987 after which point many more
employees were covered by negotiated agreements than previously.  When
considering earnings differentials by manual/non-manual groups, we find that
the earnings structure for these 2 groups seems to have diverged significantly
between 1987 and 1994.18
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Appendix: Results of Earnings Equations











Married 0.01777 0.0433 0.410 0.0816 0.0315 2.59
Years out of labour force -0.02588 0.011 -2.356 -0.0309 0.0071 -4.361
Years out squared 0.0006 0.0005 1.162 0.0009 0.0003 3.354
Years of Experience 0.0769 0.0092 8.341 0.0645 0.0051 12.485
Experience squared -0.0014 0.0003 -5.138 -0.0012 0.0001 -7.517
Education
Some secondary 0.1042 0.0627 1.661 0.0329 0.0677 0.486
Secondary 0.3922 0.0537 7.305 0.2532 0.0585 4.323
Diploma 0.5733 0.0733 7.818 0.3481 0.0627 5.546
University 0.8089 0.079 10.232 0.7606 0.0659 11.54
Apprenticeship -0.1593 0.0776 -2.051 0.0647 0.0804 0.805
Constant 0.4578 0.068 6.732 4.355 0.0594 73.33











Married 0.199 0.0336 5.923 0.2262 0.0312 7.237
Years out of labour force -0.0572 0.0121 -4.72 -0.0384 0.0103 -3.702
Years out squared 0.0021 0.0006 3.459 0.0019 0.0004 5.076
Years of Experience 0.0464 0.0041 11.235 0.0542 0.0035 15.395
Experience squared -0.0007 0.0001 -8.456 -0.0008 0.0001 -11.254
Education
Some secondary 0.1659 0.0323 5.139 0.1749 0.0286 6.103
Secondary 0.3996 0.0353 11.315 0.3732 0.031 12.013
Diploma 0.5102 0.0472 10.81 0.5005 0.0463 10.816
University 0.7794 0.0521 14.94 0.8381 0.0373 22.458
Apprenticeship -0.0252 0.0244 -1.031 0.0684 0.0289 2.367
Constant 0.671 0.0477 14.07 4.357 0.0365 119.2









Married -0.0003 0.0375 -0.007 0.0427 0‘.027 1.577
Years out of labour force -0.0105 0.00980 -1.069 -0.0267 0.0057 -4.695
Years out squared -0.0001 0.0004 -0.059 0.0008 0.0002 3.802
Years of Experience 0.0579 0.007 8.230 0.0482 0.0048 10.059
Experience squared -0.0011 0.0002 -5.656 -0.0009 0.0001 -6.693
Education
Some secondary 0.0782 0.0526 1.487 -0.0128 0.0495 -0.258
Secondary 0.2221 0.0516 4.301 0.0986 0.0471 2.094
Diploma 0.2996 0.0714 4.197 0.1823 0.0554 3.289
University 0.4821 0.0944 5.107 0.44 0.0621 7.079
Apprenticeship 0.0125 0.0745 0.168 0.1311 0.0536 2.444
Agri. -0.1318 0.0671 -1.965 -0.0702 0.048 -1.463
Building & Construction -0.3417 0.2515 -1.359 0.1316 0.1244 1.058
Wholesaling -0.1111 0.0925 -1.201 -0.0355 0.0503 -0.707
Retailing -0.2245 0.10005 -2.243 -0.1871 0.0615 -3.044
Insurance 0.0795 0.0699 1.137 0.1037 0.055 1.883
Transport -0.0981 0.0766 -1.281 -0.0026 0.063 -0.042
Professional Services -0.1344 0.1162 -1.157 -0.1157 0.0887 -1.305
Teaching -0.0997 0.0935 -1.067 -0.0273 0.0578 -0.474
Health -0.0685 0.064 -1.070 -0.0088 0.0506 -0.175
Public Admin. -0.1552 0.0643 -2.414 -0.0867 0.057 -1.521
Personal Services -0.4029 0.0935 -4.309 -0.2434 0.0623 -3.903
Other -0.2746 0.1498 -1.832 -0.1771 0.0535 -3.307
Agri. workers no obs. -1.932 0.682 -2.834
Labourers 0.0921 0.1401 0.657 0.0776 0.0701 1.107
Transport &
Communication Workers
0.0842 0.0665 1.266 0.0836 0.0675 1.237
Clerical 0.2167 0.0582 3.726 0.1362 0.0481 2.832
Commerce, Insurance &
Finance
-0.0071 0.1152 -0.062 -0.0075 0.0632 -0.118
Service Workers 0.01 0.0756 0.132 -0.0383 0.052 -0.736
Professional Workers 0.3286 0.0739 4.446 0.3097 0.0538 5.76
Others 0.3908 0.1113 3.511 0.5163 0.0842 6.13
Union member 0.2030 0.0361 5.627 0.1724 0.0244 7.057
constant 0.5645 0.0638 8.850 4.51 0.0575 78.397
F-test on industry coefficients
F(12,569)=3.53 F(12,944)=5.17
Prob>F=0.00 Prob>F=0.00











Married 0.1514 0.0296 5.109 0.1909 0.0259 7.361
Years out of labour force -0.0471 0.0109 -4.325 -0.0283 0.0088 -3.195
Years out squared 0.0018 0.0005 3.366 0.0014 0.0004 3.63921
Years of Experience 0.0398 0.0038 10.469 0.0447 0.0031 14.313
Experience squared -0.0006 0.0001 -8.116 -0.0007 0.0001 -10.509
Education
Some secondary 0.1335 0.0284 4.692 0.1271 0.0265 4.787
Secondary 0.2822 0.0321 8.774 0.2708 0.0297 9.113
Diploma 0.3866 0.0457 8.462 0.3638 0.0442 8.231
University 0.5941 0.0637 9.322 0.6574 0.0418 15.706
Apprenticeship 0.0053 0.0262 0.202 0.0749 0.0282 2.656
Agri. -0.1134 0.0764 -1.484 -0.3668 0.0642 -5.707
Building & Construction -0.0964 0.053 -1.82 -0.0507 0.0334 -1.516
Wholesaling -0.074 0.0711 -1.041 -0.0312 0.0349 -0.895
Retailing -0.2088 0.0507 -4.119 -0.1967 0.0483 -4.071
Insurance 0.2386 0.0614 3.888 0.0883 0.0499 1.769
Transport -0.0092 0.0304 -0.303 0.0471 0.0294 1.602
Professional Services 0.0012 0.1252 0.01 -0.3311 0.1487 -2.227
Teaching -0.1231 0.072 -1.711 -0.1488 0.0467 -3.187
Health -0.1114 0.048 -2.319 -0.0371 0.0517 -0.717
Public Admin. -0.0585 0.034 -1.718 -0.0437 0.0317 -1.38
Personal Services -0.2251 0.0704 -3.198 -0.1028 0.0541 -1.898
Other -0.0383 0.0779 -0.492 -0.1145 0.0609 -1.879
Agri. workers -0.0894 0.0693 -1.29 -0.136 0.0745 -1.825
Labourers -0.1013 0.0437 -2.316 -0.0991 0.0333 -2.971
Transport &
Communication Workers
-0.0687 0.0342 -2.011 -0.0873 0.031 -2.811
Clerical 0.0702 0.0478 1.467 0.0325 0.0361 0.900
Commerce, Insurance &
Finance
0.117 0.0558 2.096 0.0109 0.0406 0.269
Service Workers 0.0797 0.044 1.813 0.0139 0.0403 0.344
Professional Workers 0.2215 0.0525 4.219 0.196 0.0415 4.73
Others 0.2359 0.048 4.928 0.2984 0.0352 8.463
Union member 0.1675 0.0234 7.165 0.128 0.0194 6.585
constant 0.734 0.0443 16.55 4.499 0.0376 119.50
F-test on industry coefficients
F(12,1150)=5.11 F(12,1760)=6.88
Prob>F=0.00 Prob>F=0.00











Female -0.1489 0.0249 -5.972 -0.1675 0.0198 -8.449
Married 0.0916 0.0229 4.000 0.1418 0.0192 7.395
Years out of labour force -0.0282 0.007 -4.003 -0.0297 0.0051 -5.857
Years out squared 0.0007 0.0003 2.296 0.001 0.0002 4.715
Years of Experience 0.0463 0.0032 14.427 0.0446 0.0025 17.834
Experience squared -0.0007 0.0001 -11.127 -0.007 0.0001 -12.876
Education
Some secondary 0.1302 0.0254 5.12 0.0875 0.0246 3.54922
Secondary 0.2800 0.0272 10.296 0.2207 0.0253 8.699
Diploma 0.3799 0.0384 9.876 0.3073 0.0337 9.103
University 0.5716 0.053 10.79 0.5919 0.0348 16.975
Apprenticeship 0.0108 0.0251 0.432 0.0881 0.0259 3.402
Agri. -0.1486 0.0710 -2.092 -0.367 0.0633 -5.799
Building & Construction -0.1305 0.0508 -2.565 -0.0483 0.0324 -1.494
Wholesaling -0.0772 0.0588 -1.314 -0.0375 0.0302 -1.244
Retailing -0.2392 0.0453 -5.28 -0.2154 0.0381 -5.652
Insurance 0.1776 0.045 3.942 0.1017 0.0357 2.847
Transport -0.032 0.0285 -1.121 0.0318 0.0261 1.215
Professional Services -0.0739 0.0847 -0.872 -0.253 0.1057 -2.393
Teaching -0.1224 0.0573 -2.134 -0.1096 0.0354 -3.09
Health -0.0697 0.0379 -1.838 -0.034 0.0334 -1.018
Public Admin. -0.0849 0.0305 -2.78 -0.0552 0.0292 -1.891
Personal Services -0.322 0.0596 -5.397 -0.1889 0.0421 -4.487
Other -0.1069 0.0708 -1.51 -0.1468 0.0411 -3.568
Agri. workers -0.0725 0.0634 -1.144 -0.171 0.0805 -2.122
Labourers -0.1008 0.0397 -2.54 -0.0773 0.0298 -2.594
Transport &
Communication Workers
-0.0465 0.0311 -1.495 -0.0604 0.0286 -2.111
Clerical 0.1239 0.0346 3.582 0.0737 0.0271 2.718
Commerce, Insurance &
Finance
0.0712 0.0508 1.402 0.0173 0.0353 0.489
Service Workers 0.0406 0.0393 1.033 -0.0073 0.0318 -0.231
Professional Workers 0.2628 0.0417 6.298 0.2374 0.0326 7.284
Others 0.2629 0.0439 5.987 0.3411 0.0319 10.684
Union member 0.1743 0.0197 8.826 0.1475 0.0156 9.463
constant 0.7183 0.038 18.881 4.569 0.0314 145.22
F-test on industry coefficients
F(12,1749)=8.35 F(12,2735)=11.2
Prob>F=0.00 Prob>F=0.00











Married 0.1013 0.0671 1.509 0.2959 0.0565 5.235
Married 94 -0.0577 0.0925 -0.624 -0.1460 0.0749 -1.948
Years out of labour force -0.0615 0.0162 -3.796 -0.2244 0.0182 -12.330
Years out of labour force 94 0.0977 0.0274 3.559 0.2915 0.0236 12.364
Years out squared 0.0015 0.0007 2.166 0.0109 0.0012 8.805
Years out squared 94 -0.0018 0.0011 -1.572 -0.0115 0.0016 -7.208
Years of Experience -0.0354 0.0135 -2.622 -0.0723 0.007 -10.278
Years of Experience 94 0.1633 0.0158 10.3 0.1925 0.0081 23.832
Experience squared 0.001 0.0003 3.045 0.0012 0.0001 8.56
Experience squared 94 -0.0036 0.0004 -7.993 -0.0029 0.0002 -16.217
Education
Some secondary -0.8249 0.1111 -7.422 -0.5634 0.054 -10.43323
Some secondary 94 2.301 0.1262 18.229 1.615 0.0649 24.877
Secondary -0.7015 0.1068 -6.566 -0.4396 0.0563 -7.806
Secondary 94 2.593 0.0878 29.536 1.842 0.0624 29.502
Diploma -0.4469 0.1192 -3.749 -0.2087 0.0749 -2.787
Diploma 94 2.503 0.1106 22.631 1.765 0.0927 19.042
University -0.1769 0.146 -1.212 0.0878 0.0769 1.143
University 94 2.621 0.152 17.246 1.6989 0.0925 18.352
Apprenticeship -0.3944 0.1904 -2.072 -0.1498 0.0385 -3.886
Apprenticeship 94 0.879 0.2801 3.138 0.3116 0.06 5.197
Constant 2.2 0.133 16.541 2.641 0.0702 37.639











Married 0.0741 0.0569 1.302 0.1734 0.0487 3.557
Married 94 -0.0529 0.0794 -0.666 -0.0586 0.0669 -0.875
Years out of labour force -0.0506 0.0158 -3.211 -0.1749 0.0177 -9.891
Years out of labour force 94 0.0802 0.0256 3.136 0.2251 0.0225 10.009
Years out squared 0.0013 0.0007 1.856 0.009 0.0010 8.398
Years out squared 94 -0.0016 0.0011 -1.537 -0.0095 0.0014 -6.82
Years of Experience -0.0257 0.0113 -2.266 -0.0542 0.0064 -8.459
Years of Experience 94 0.1182 0.0138 8.527 0.1558 0.0074 21.03
Experience squared 0.0008 0.0003 2.907 0.0009 0.0001 7.546
Experience squared 94 -0.0026 0.0004 -6.925 -0.0023 0.0001 -14.893
Education
Some secondary -0.5743 0.0964 -5.957 -0.4572 0.0479 -9.532
Some secondary 94 1.584 0.1202 13.181 1.385 0.0617 22.427
Secondary -0.5555 0.0978 -5.687 -0.4408 0.0548 -8.033
Secondary 94 1.854 0.1055 17.577 1.641 0.0662 24.795
Diploma -0.4558 0.1111 -4.100 -0.2787 0.0722 -3.861
Diploma 94 1.900 0.1231 15.43 1.6184 0.092 17.583
University -0.2755 0.1451 -1.898 -0.0677 0.0908 -0.746
University 94 2.045 0.1613 12.676 1.701 0.1083 15.700
Apprenticeship -0.1613 0.1372 -1.176 -0.1685 0.0407 -4.141
Apprenticeship 94 0.5656 0.1765 3.204 0.3975 0.0608 6.541
Agri. -0.5162 0.1000 -5.162 -0.3574 0.1523 -2.347
Agri. 94 0.8151 0.1259 6.471 0.1969 0.1968 1.000
Building & Construction -0.3923 0.3302 -1.188 -0.3502 0.0649 -5.397
Building & Construction 94 0.6873 0.3578 1.921 0.6602 0.0799 8.262
Wholesaling -0.1874 0.1563 -1.199 -0.2497 0.0889 -2.807
Wholesaling 94 0.4164 0.1889 2.205 0.5201 0.1044 4.979
Retailing -0.2908 0.1366 -2.128 -0.4766 0.076 -6.267
Retailing 94 0.2360 0.1699 1.389 0.6585 0.1073 6.138
Insurance 0.2854 0.1058 2.698 0.1705 0.0836 2.039
Insurance 94 -0.1089 0.1295 -0.841 -0.0023 0.1068 -0.021
Transport 0.1849 0.1273 1.452 -0.0157 0.0489 -0.321
Transport 94 -0.1495 0.1568 -0.953 0.0918 0.0727 1.26224
Professional Services -0.213 0.1879 -1.134 -0.1226 0.2208 -0.555
Professional Services 94 -0.0532 0.2323 -0.229 -0.1777 0.2989 -0.595
Teaching 0.1302 0.1318 0.988 -0.1194 0.0964 -1.239
Teaching 94 -0.2861 0.1569 -1.823 -0.1998 0.1166 -1.713
Health 0.0972 0.0979 0.993 -0.1363 0.0686 -1.986
Health 94 -0.1221 0.1234 -0.989 0.2039 0.1108 1.841
Public Admin. 0.0666 0.1022 0.652 -0.0984 0.0519 -1.895
Public Admin. 94 -0.198 0.1275 -1.555 0.0961 0.0724 1.328
Personal Services -0.4532 0.1399 -3.240 -0.6300 0.1367 -4.608
Personal Services 94 0.4688 0.1736 2.700 0.873 0.158 5.523
Other -0.2692 0.2354 -1.143 -0.3719 0.1471 -2.528
Other 94 0.2037 0.2496 0.816 0.4962 0.1646 3.015
Agri. Workers -1.381 0.4768 -2.897 -0.5026 0.1377 -3.649




Labourers -0.8569 0.1400 -6.121 -0.4182 0.0607 -6.891
Labourers 94 1.557 0.1705 9.131 0.721 0.0834 8.637
Transport & Communication
Workers
-0.681 0.1363 -4.995 -0.2971 0.0571 -5.198
Transport & Communication
Workers 94
1.452 0.2010 7.225 0.5377 0.077 6.982
Clerical -0.4614 0.1124 -4.105 -0.0301 0.0747 -0.403
Clerical 94 0.9254 0.1295 7.146 0.2100 0.0957 2.194
Commerce, Insurance &
Finance
-0.702 0.1684 -4.169 -0.5201 0.0799 -0.651
Commerce, Insurance &
Finance 94
1.1768 0.1946 6.047 0.2884 0.1026 2.81
Service Workers -0.8213 0.1401 -5.86 0.0575 0.0732 0.785
Service Workers 94 1.311 0.1589 8.25 0.1333 0.0937 1.423
Professional Workers -0.2267 0.1295 -1.751 0.1968 0.0761 2.585
Professional Workers 94 0.8685 0.1532 5.667 0.1254 0.0962 1.303
Others -0.2037 0.1743 -1.169 0.1836 0.0707 2.597
Others 94 1.0941 0.2092 5.229 0.2068 0.0891 2.322
Union member -0.0689 0.0565 -1.22 -0.0345 0.0363 -0.949
Union member 94 0.4065 0.0681 5.971 0.30 0.0463 6.473
Constant 2.4642 0.1423 17.321 2.6525 0.0719 38.867